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Introduction
There have been many attempts to coordinate 
the corporate taxation systems of EU 
Member States. First, in 1962, the European 
Commission suggested splitting the corporate 
tax rates and applying a different tax rate for 
retained and distributed profi ts. Furthermore, 
eight years later, the Temple report suggested 
the implementation of a classical system of 
corporate taxation in the EU Member States. 
Consequently, the European Commission 
tried to approximate corporate tax rates – it 
elaborated a proposal on a common level of 
corporate taxation between 45% and 55% 
and, recently, on a minimum corporate tax rate 
of 30%. However, because of obstacles and 
barriers, those harmonization efforts were not 
very successful. Two main obstacles to the 
harmonization process can be identifi ed. First, 
the member states perceived a harmonization 
process as the effort to restrict their fi scal 
sovereignty than the advantage under which 
companies could fully benefi t from the existence 
of the Internal Market. Second, harmonization 
measures need to be introduced in the form 
of directives that require unanimous voting, 
i.e., the directive has to be adopted by all EU 
member states. This very often resulted in the 
situation, in which harmonization measurement 
was blocked by one or two member states. 
Based on the fi ndings of Ruding’s Committee, 
the non-harmonization of corporate taxation 
(i.e., the existence of different taxation systems 
in the Internal Market) causes obstacles mainly 
in the form of distortion of the decisions on 
the investment placement of multinational 
corporations, as the nominal corporate tax 
rate represents an important decision factor. 
Moreover, the lack of harmonization of corporate 
taxation resulted in the negative harmonization 
through the judgments of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union.
Therefore, the European Commission 
decided to try to harmonize only the provisions 
affecting the smooth functioning of the Internal 
Market, which is understood as the main benefi t 
of the harmonization of corporate taxation. 
Currently, there are many loopholes stemming 
from the existence of 28 national corporate 
taxation systems, enabling multinational 
corporations to apply aggressive tax-planning 
techniques. Harmonization of corporate tax 
bases therefore represents a very important 
tool in the fi ght against tax evasion and tax 
fraud.
As David and Nerudová added (2008), the 
long-term aim of the European Commission 
is to reduce the individual differences in the 
tax systems of the Member States, whether 
through tax harmonization or through tax 
coordination, in order to avoid causing 
obstacles to the smooth functioning of the 
Internal Market or the ineffi cient allocation of 
production factors or production caused by 
the obstacles of a tax character. Therefore, 
in 2001, the European Commission suggested 
four alternative proposals for corporate income 
tax harmonization – the Home State Taxation 
System, the European Union Company Tax, the 
Compulsory Harmonized Corporate Tax Base 
and the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base. After the discussion of all four models, 
the European Commission decided to set the 
implementation of the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (hereinafter CCCTB) long-
term. This represents one of the most ambitious 
projects in the history of the effort towards 
harmonization. The uniqueness of the project 
lies in the fact that, on one hand, it suggested 
unifi ed rules for the construction of the tax 
corporate base and, on the other hand, it did not 
breach the national sovereignty of EU member 
states to independently apply the corporate tax 
rate. After more than ten years of work on this 
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project, the Commission published the CCCTB 
Directive proposal on March 16, 2011.
The implementation of the CCCTB is 
connected not only to the grouping for taxation 
purposes and consolidation but also to the 
problem of the tax-sharing mechanism, which 
has raised much discussion. Finally, the 
directive proposal suggests the allocation 
formula – that the consolidated tax base should 
be shared among the members of the group 
based on micro factors. That new allocation rule 
had an impact on EU Member States’ budgets 
and therefore turned out to be the most diffi cult 
part of the negotiation of the CCCTB Directive.
Therefore, the European Commission 
decided to re-launch the CCCTB system 
using the so-called step-by-step approach on 
June 17, 2015. This approach allowed for the 
introduction of the common rules for tax base 
construction very quickly (just the common 
corporate tax base without the possibility of 
tax consolidation), as the CCCTB was newly 
understood not only as a tool for the signifi cant 
improvement of the business environment but 
also mainly as an important instrument for 
fair, effi cient and transparent taxation within 
the EU. With a common tax base, all EU 
Member States would apply the same rules 
for tax base construction; therefore, structural 
harmonization in the area of corporate taxation 
would be reached. This should help EU Member 
States in the fi ght against base erosion and 
profi t shifting, which is also addressed by the 
OECD and G20 in the BEPS (Base Erosion and 
Profi t Shifting Project) project. Consequently, 
the second step of the consolidation regime 
should be introduced.
The aim of this paper is to research the 
impact of mandatory CCCTB implementation 
in the Eurozone on the tax bases and, 
consequently, on corporate tax revenues 
in the Czech Republic and to identify whether 
the implementation of the system will result 
in outfl ow or infl ow of tax bases into the Czech 
Republic. The empirical analysis is based 
on the data available from the Amadeus and 
Bankscope databases. This paper presents 
the results of the research within the GA CR 
project No. 13-21683S, “The quantifi cation of 
the impact of the introduction of the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base on the 
budget revenues in the Czech Republic”.
1. Literature Review
1.1 Harmonization of Taxation 
According to Musgrave (1967), harmonization 
is understood as the process of national fi scal 
systems’ adjustment to common economic 
objectives. Dosser (1973) perceives tax 
harmonization as tax coordination between 
member states in the process of integration. 
Tax harmonization can also be understood 
as the process (the tools for reaching the 
selected aim) and the result (harmonization of 
tax legislation itself) together Nerudová (2014). 
Kubátová (1998) perceives tax harmonization 
as the national tax systems’ adjustment and 
convergence under observance of the common 
rules. Further, the author states three phases of 
harmonization. First, the tax to be harmonized 
must be selected. Second, the harmonization 
of the tax base takes place, and last, the 
tax rate is harmonized. According to Simon 
(2000), total harmonization, which is reached 
through the three above-mentioned phases 
of harmonization, means that each member 
state applies the same taxes on the same tax 
base and applies the same tax rate. Thus, total 
harmonization is the result of the structural 
harmonization and harmonization of the tax rate 
in contrast to the partial harmonization when 
member states apply both common provisions 
and national provisions.
Under the EC Treaty in Art 93 and 94, tax 
harmonization is considered a tool for reaching of 
smooth functioning of the Internal Market. Based 
on it, tax harmonization can be categorized into 
positive and negative harmonization. As Nerudová 
(2014) states, positive tax harmonization 
represents the process of the convergence of 
the national tax systems of member states by 
the implementation of directives, regulations and 
other legislative tools. On the contrary, negative 
harmonization is the result of the activity of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Another 
categorization of tax harmonization, as Nerudová 
(2014) states, is direct or indirect harmonization. 
Direct tax harmonization is understood as 
a classical harmonization process, which tries to 
harmonize the regulations directly by means of 
tax directives. This is in contrast to indirect tax 
harmonization being understood as the effort to 
reach the harmonization of certain tax regulations 
by means of harmonization of different areas of 
law – for example, commercial law or company 
law – which is currently visible in the area of 
corporate taxation.
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In the fi eld of direct taxation, there have 
been many attempts to coordinate the corporate 
taxation systems of EU member states. First, 
in 1962, the European Commission suggested 
splitting the corporate tax rates and applying 
a different tax rate for retained and distributed 
profi ts. Furthermore, in 1970, the Temple report 
suggested implementing a classical system of 
corporate taxation in the EU Member States. 
Consequently, the European Commission 
tried to approximate the corporate tax rates 
– it elaborated a proposal on a common level 
of corporate taxation between 45% and 55%, 
most recently, on a minimum corporate tax 
rate of 30%. Further, based on the research of 
Ruding´s Committee, the European Commission 
also proposed uniform tax base rules and 
a maximum corporate tax rate of 40%. However, 
those harmonization efforts were not successful; 
therefore, the European Commission decided to 
try to harmonize only the provisions affecting the 
smooth functioning of the Internal Market, i.e., 
through partial and indirect harmonization.
Therefore, there is not an integrated 
European tax system in the European Union, 
but rather a junction of different national tax 
systems, which increases the compliance costs 
of taxation. As Hitris (1994) states, the situation 
in the European Union fully corresponds to the 
fi scal divergence – there is no rapprochement, 
which is defi ned as the situation in which all 
the member states apply the same tax system. 
The harmonization process that aimed to reach 
a unifi ed taxation system (through the total 
direct harmonization of national tax systems) 
turned into the convergence and approximation 
of the taxation systems, as Hitiris (1994) and 
Kubátová (1998) state.
In 2001, in respect to the high sensitivity of 
investments to the differences in the corporate 
taxation and the fact that the tax systems 
should be neutral, the European Commission 
proposed four possible models of corporate 
income tax harmonization, namely, Home 
State Taxation (corporations adopt the taxation 
of companies with “European” activities the 
rules valid in the home country in which the 
headquarters is situated), CCCTB (supposes 
the existence of the common rules for tax base 
constructions), European Union Company Tax 
(large multinational corporations use the uniform 
consolidated tax base and unifi ed corporate 
income tax rate within the EU) and Compulsory 
Harmonized Corporate Tax Base (this system 
would introduce the uniform tax base for every 
company in the EU). At fi rst, the European 
Commission chose a twin-track strategy 
with a long-term target in the form of CCCTB 
for corporations with European activities, 
but ultimately, the European Commission 
decided to set only the implementation of the 
CCCTB. After more than ten years of work, the 
Commission published the CCCTB Directive 
proposal on March 16, 2011.
Tax harmonization is still facing many 
obstacles and barriers. The most serious 
obstacle can be considered the political barrier 
ensuing from the unwillingness to harmonize 
tax provisions, which can cause obstacles to 
smooth the functioning of common market 
or market deformations. EU member states 
perceived a harmonization process as the effort 
to restrict their fi scal sovereignty. Moreover, 
harmonization measures must be introduced 
by the European Commission in the form 
of a directive to be legally binding for all EU 
member states, which represents the second 
serious barrier to complete full harmonization.
Tax harmonization may also bring some 
cons. It leads to a higher tax rate because, without 
competition, governments may establish higher 
taxes, i.e., tax harmonization does not create 
pressure on the expenditure side of budgets. 
Tax harmonization may therefore also lead to 
lower economic growth, for higher tax rates 
decrease productivity and discourage foreign 
capital. Moreover, tax harmonization does not 
prevent the oversized expansion of the public 
sector. Further, it restricts the fi scal sovereignty 
of the EU Member States, as mentioned above, 
and can signifi cantly endanger the budget 
revenues of the Member States applying higher 
tax rates than when harmonized.
In contrast, tax harmonization may bring 
several pros, such as the elimination of the risk of 
double taxation, the elimination of base erosion 
and profi t shifting mainly through the migration 
of national tax bases to the countries with 
more favorable tax regimes. Tax harmonization 
also eliminates tax arbitrations arising from 
the existence of different tax regimes. It can 
further remarkably decrease compliance costs 
of taxation and may help to establish fair tax 
competition (within the meaning that all actors 
on the market do have the same information 
about the tax rate). Moreover, companies in the 
Internal Market may fully exploit the connected 
advantages.
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In June 2015, as a reaction to the base 
erosion and profi t shifting EU Member States 
are currently facing in the area of corporate 
taxation in the EU, the European Commission 
introduced the Action Plan for Fair and Effi cient 
Corporate Taxation, announcing the re-launch 
of the CCCTB system to the common corporate 
tax base (hereinafter CCTB) system, i.e., from 
the common consolidated corporate tax base 
towards the common corporate tax base without 
the consolidation regime. This approach allows 
us to introduce fi rst the CCTB rules and, second, 
the consolidation regime. Moreover, the CCTB 
system should be introduced as a mandatory 
system because the existence of two different 
taxation systems for corporations within the 
EU (i.e., CCTB or CCCTB recently and the 
national tax system), could open the space for 
speculations, tax fraud and various types of tax 
arbitrations. Interestingly, the CCTB (CCCTB) 
could serve not only as a tool for the signifi cant 
improvement of the business environment but 
also as a powerful tool against corporate tax 
avoidance, which can make corporate taxation 
in the EU much more transparent and can help 
to decrease aggressive tax planning. In addition, 
according to the European Commission, 
CCTB also represents a framework for the 
implementation of many of the new standards 
agreed on through OECD in the BEPS project. 
In this respect, the European Commission 
presented the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
as part of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package on 
January 28, 2016.
1.2 Sharing Mechanism
The implementation of the consolidation 
regime is indivisibly connected to the need for 
the implementation of the mechanism for the 
sharing of the group tax base among Member 
States. The taxation theory offers several 
mechanisms for the sharing of the tax base. 
Some have already been implemented, e.g., in 
the USA and Canada.
The factors employed in the mechanism 
for sharing the tax base can be divided into 
formulary apportionment based on macrofactors 
(usually aggregated at the national level – i.e., 
for example GDP or national VAT tax base) 
and microfactors. As mentioned by Lodin and 
Gammie (2001), the selection of the individual 
method of formulary apportionment, as well as 
the selection of factors, signifi cantly infl uences 
the size of the allocated group tax base. The 
taxation theory offers two possible methods 
in the case of formulary apportionment 
with microfactors – Value Added Methods 
(hereinafter VA) and an Allocation Formula 
(hereinafter FA).
A parallel can be found between the VA 
method and the methods of the determination of 
company value added. As in the case of company 
value added, the VA method can be based on 
adding principle and subtracting principle.
The value added of the group member for 
taxation purposes with the application of the 
subtracting principle is calculated as follows:
 (1)
where TVO represents total value of outputs 
and TVI the total value of inputs.
The value added of the group member for 
taxation purposes with the application of the 
adding principle is determined as follows:
 (2)
where LC represents labor compensation, 
I stands for interests and P represent profi ts.
Considering this formulary apportionment 
as a sharing mechanism for the group tax base, 
it is necessary to take into account the territory 
dimension of the method and to determine the 
state in which the value added was created 
– whether in the member state in which the 
goods were produced or in the member state 
in which the goods were sold. Based on this, 
the tax theory differs between the destination-
based VA method (i.e., the method under which 
the value added is created in the member state 
where the goods are sold) and the origin-based 
VA method (i.e., the method under which the 
value added is created in the member state 
where the goods were produced).
In the CCCTB situation, the VA would be 
employed for the allocation of the group tax 
base, and the share of the total value of the 
group would be determined as follows:
 (3)
where  (i = 1,…n) represents all jurisdictions 
where the group is active) is the share of the 
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jurisdiction on the group tax base, allocated 
based on the value added. Based on the above-
stated allocation formula, the consolidated 
group tax base would be allocated amongst the 
corporations operating in individual member 
states based on their share on total value 
added of the group, as previously mentioned in 
the literature (Agúndez-García, 2006).
Formulary apportionment represents the 
tool traditionally used for tax base sharing in 
the USA and Canada. The history of formulary 
apportionment in the USA goes back to the 
1870s, where it had been fi rst applied in the 
area of property taxation. As mentioned in the 
literature (Weiner, 2005), instead of measuring 
a company’s property in an individual state, 
the companies measured their property, and 
the tax base was distributed to individual 
states based on the share of railways in each 
individual state. For income taxation purposes, 
the FA was fi rst applied in Wisconsin. At the 
end of the 1930s, nearly all companies already 
applied the three-factor formula with equally 
weighted factors. This formula is known as the 
Massachusetts Formula in taxation theory and 
can be expressed as follows:
 (4)
where Pi represents the profi t allocated to the 
state i, Pt is the profi t of the companies, C stands 
for capital and S represent sales. As mentioned 
in the literature (Mayer, 2009), since the 1980s, 
states have moved from equally weighted 
factors towards the allocation formula, where 
higher weight is put on the sales factor, while 
the weight in the case of payroll and capital was 
decreased.
The development of allocation mechanism 
in Canada has been slightly different from 
its development in the USA. As mentioned 
by Weiner (2005), originally, the allocation 
rules allocated income to the state where the 
permanent establishment of the company 
was situated. If the company possessed 
a permanent establishment in more provinces, 
income was allocated based on the company’s 
accounting or according to the share of the 
permanent establishment in the total income 
of the company. As mentioned in the literature 
(Mintz, 2004), while this system was widely 
criticized, the discussion of the possible 
implementation of the US model raised fears 
that it could allocate too much income to the 
exporting provinces. Therefore, the FA was 
modifi ed to a two-factor formula with equally 
weighted factors. The Canadian formula can be 
expressed as follows:
 (5)
where Pi represents the profi t allocated to the 
province i, Pt is the profi t of the companies, GIt 
represents the gross income of the company, 
and L is labor. The main difference between 
the US FA and the Canadian FA lies in the fact 
that federal allocation rules comprise specifi c 
rules for specifi c industry sectors – e.g., the 
insurance industry or road transportation.
According to Petutschnig (2010), the most-
used factors represent payroll, capital and 
sales. These factors are used in the allocation 
formulae in different combinations and with 
different weights. The allocation formula 
suggested in the CCCTB system comprises 
three equally weighted factors – sales, labor 
and assets. As is obvious from the below-
stated equation, the labor factor consists of 
two equally weighted factors – payroll and the 
number of employees. The allocation formula 
can be expressed as follows:
 
(6)
where S represents the sales of goods and 
services, P is payroll (comprising wages and 
salaries, bonuses and other compensation), E 
represents the number of employees (employed 
for the period of 3 months at least) and A are 
assets (including fi xed assets, buildings, 
aircraft, boats and machines).
1.3 The Effects of the CCCTB 
Implementation
The implementation of CCCTB can be connected 
to the advantages for the corporations and 
for tax administrations. The transparency 
of the effective tax rate and harmonization 
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rules for tax base construction should lead to 
the establishment of the fair tax competition 
(meaning the situation in which all market 
subjects have the same information about the 
effective tax rate) and to the elimination of tax 
obstacles of mergers and acquisitions mainly 
in the areas of capital profi t taxation, reduced 
compliance costs of taxation, the elimination of 
transfer pricing issues, and the establishment 
of the possibility of cross-border loss offsetting. 
Because the proposal of the CCCTB represents 
one of the most ambitious projects in the history 
of taxation, it initiated extensive scientifi c work, 
which can be categorized into the three main 
streams. The fi rst of them is to focus on the 
overall general concept of the CCCTB system 
and its implementation into national systems 
(Riedel & Runkel, 2006; Mintz, 2008; McLure, 
2008; Bettendorf et al., 2010; Trandafi r, 2011; 
Dankó, 2012, and others). Mintz (2008), for 
example, highlights both imposing its own 
tax rates to avoid any disruption of the fi scal 
sovereignty and direct control of tax revenues 
and tax administration, in contrast to Bettendorf 
et al. (2010), who states that the most effective 
redistribution of capital, tax revenues and 
welfare will be reached through the CCCTB 
and the uniform tax rate. Further, Riedel and 
Runkel (2006) underline the positive fi scal 
externality in the short-term CCCTB, but in the 
case of long-term CCCTB, they recommend the 
implementation of the uniform tax rate.
The second stream of the research aims at 
the analysis of allocation formula factors with 
respect to the prediction of corporate income 
(Pethig & Wagener, 2003; Agúndéz-Garcia, 
2006; Mintz, 2008; Tan, 2010; Roggeman et 
al., 2012; Krchnivá, 2014; Krchnivá & Nerudová 
2015; Cobham & Loretz, 2014; Eberhartinger 
& Petutschning, 2014, and others). According 
to Agúndéz-Garcia (2006), the most discussed 
allocation-formula factor is represented by 
assets due to the mobility of capital and 
investments. Further, Mintz (2008) considers 
the most easily measured allocation-formula 
factor to be employees’ costs. Eberhartinger 
and Petutschning (2014) add that, based on the 
number of employees, the payroll formula factor 
can be used to analyze the impacts of different 
levels of employees’ costs in EU member states 
on the allocation of consolidated corporate tax 
profi t. Roggeman et al. (2012) prove that the 
European Commission proposed allocation-
formula factors to explain the corporate tax 
profi t in the amount of 28%. This similar result 
was also found by Krchnivá and Nerudová 
(2015). According to her, the proposed CCCTB 
formula factors are able to explain almost 
35% of the variability in profi tability of the 
Czech companies, in contrast to Hines (2010), 
whose allocation-formula factors (the sales, 
assets and payroll of the U.S. companies) are 
able to explain almost 50% of the variability 
in profi tability. Furthermore, Krchnivá (2014) 
proves that the presence or proportion of 
allocation-formula factors can signifi cantly 
affect a country’s overall tax revenues. Cobham 
and Loretz (2014) state that the allocation 
of corporate tax profi t based on the tangible 
assets and number of employees is benefi cial 
in the case of low-income countries, in contrast 
to the high-income countries, for which sales 
and costs of employees are more benefi cial 
factors.
The third stream of research focuses on 
the impacts of the introduction of the CCCTB 
system on tax revenues (Fuest, Hemmelgarn, 
& Ramb, 2007; Van der Horst, Bettendorf, 
& Rojas-Romagosa, 2007; Devereux & 
Loretz, 2008; Cline et al., 2010; Domonkos, 
Domonkos, Dolinajcová, & Grisáková, 2013; 
Nerudová & Solilová, 2015, and others). Only 
a few empirical studies research the impact of 
the introduction of the CCCTB on the budget 
revenues of EU Member States. Unfortunately, 
none of the studies focuses on the scenario 
that the CCCTB will be implemented through 
enhanced cooperation (i.e., not by all EU 
Member States).
The paper by Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb 
(2007) simulated the scenario of mandatory 
CCCTB. It is based on the data on German 
company-level foreign direct investment and 
data from balance sheets. These authors use 
the smallest dataset for their research – 2,000 
German parent companies and 6,000 foreign 
subsidiaries in other EU Member States 
between 1996 and 2000. Based on the results 
of the research, the authors estimate that 
national tax bases would decline by 20% on 
average.
Furthermore, the paper by Van der Horst, 
Bettendorf & Rojas-Romagosa (2007) also 
simulated the scenario of mandatory CCCTB. 
However, the authors perform the research 
in 17 EU Member States. It is necessary to 
mention that the budgetary impacts were not 
the main research question. The paper aims 
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primarily at the welfare effects connected with 
the introduction of the system. This study also 
assumes that all companies have to opt for 
the CCCTB. This research is based on the 
equilibrium model, which expects that each 
of the 17 EU Member States has a parent 
company with subsidiaries in each of the 
remaining Member States. They conclude that 
the obligatory implementation of the CCCTB 
in 17 EU Member States would result in an 
increase in welfare of 0.02% of GDP.
The paper by Deveraux and Loretz (2008) 
represents a more complex study. The paper 
researches two scenarios – voluntary and 
mandatory CCCTB. The research is based on 
a large dataset of 50,000 companies during the 
period in the years 2000-2004. The research 
revealed that under a voluntary system, tax 
revenues could decrease by 2.5%, while under 
a mandatory system, revenues could increase 
by 2%. It is important to mention that this 
study also proved that the effect on the budget 
revenues of individual Member States would be 
unequal, for it varies from -18% to +60%.
The most recent and last study by Cline et 
al. (2010) researched three possible scenarios 
– mandatory CCCTB in all EU Member States, 
voluntary CCCTB in all EU Member States and 
mandatory CCCTB in 9 EU Member States. 
The study is built on the largest dataset so far 
– on a model of 200,000 companies in the year 
2005. The scenario of a mandatory CCCTB 
system in 27 Member States also revealed 
that there would be unequal impacts, that is, 
that there would be winners and losers. The 
effect on corporate income tax collection varied 
from -8.3% in Denmark to +6.0% in France. 
It is necessary to mention that this study 
represents the only study to predict the effects 
on the budget of the Czech Republic. Under the 
mandatory implementation of the CCCTB, the 
Czech Republic would lose 3.0% of corporate 
tax collection. In the case that the system was 
voluntary in 27 Member States, the range of 
changes would be narrower – from -7.7% in 
Germany to +2.6% in the United Kingdom. The 
Czech Republic would lose roughly the same 
– i.e., -3.1% of corporate tax collection. The 
scenario of mandatory CCCTB in 9 Member 
States revealed that the change in corporate 
tax collection would vary from -8.5% in the 
Netherlands to +5.7% in France.
The impact of CCCTB implementation in the 
EU28 on the budgetary revenues of selected 
countries only was researched by Nerudová 
and Solilová (2015) and Solilová and Nerudová 
(2016) for the case of the Czech Republic. 
A study researching the impact of CCCTB 
implementation on the budget revenues in the 
Slovak Republic was conducted by Domonkos, 
Domonkos, Dolinajcová and Grisáková (2013). 
Another study by Pirvu et al. (2011) researched 
the impact of CCCTB implementation on tax 
revenue in Romania.
2. Data and Methodology
The research is based on the data from the 
Amadeus database (update 227), which 
includes standardized fi nancial information 
on more than 18 million public and private 
companies in 43 European countries, as well 
as on current studies by Devereux and Loretz 
(2008), Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb (2007) 
and Clien et al. (2010). Moreover, our research 
covers data from the Bankscope database 
(updated in January 2014) including information 
on over 32,000 banks, public and private, 
and the leading 35 supranational banking 
and fi nancial organizations from all over the 
world. Specifi cally, the top 8,000 European 
banks, the top 14,000 North American banks, 
1,000 Japanese banks, 1,200 Russian banks, 
over 7,000 other major banks and the leading 
35 supranational banking and fi nancial 
organizations.
With respect to the aim of this paper, it 
was necessary to obtain from the databases 
the group of the Czech companies and other 
EU companies with a connection to the Czech 
Republic (i.e. having subsidiaries in the Czech 
Republic) that would qualify under the CCCTB 
system for the consolidation regime and group 
treatment. For this purpose, we followed 
the approach of the proposal of the CCCTB 
Directive and performed a two-tiered test. This 
test consists of two layers: control, which is 
assumed if the controlling company holds at 
least 50.01% of the controlled company, and 
ownership, which is assumed if the ownership 
rights amount to more than 75% of the 
company’s capital.
From the Amadeus database, based on the 
two-tiered test, 1,587 Czech parent companies 
with 2,427 subsidiaries in the Czech Republic 
and other EU Member States, and 816 other 
EU parent companies with 1,135 subsidiaries 
in the Czech Republic were identifi ed. From 
the Bankscope database, based on the 
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 two-tiered test, 10 Czech parent companies 
with 49 subsidiaries in the Czech Republic 
and other EU Member States and 11 other EU 
parent companies with 249 subsidiaries in the 
Czech Republic were identifi ed. The overall 
number of companies, specifi cally 2,424 parent 
companies with 3,860 subsidiaries, represents 
fi nal dataset with all necessary data.
However, given this overall number of 
companies, we faced the problem of missing 
information in the fi nancial statements of some 
companies. In order to preserve the extent of 
the dataset, we followed the approach of Clien 
et al. (2010) and decided to impute missing 
information in order to maximize the number 
of companies in the analysis. Therefore, we 
performed a sensitivity analysis, employing 
three missing data methods, i.e., regression, 
imputation and multiple imputation, for the 
selection of the best method for data imputation 
to avoid signifi cantly distorting the allocation of 
the CCCTB between the EU Member States. 
Based on the obtained results, the method 
of imputation was selected, using reported 
tangible fi xed assets and the industry-specifi c 
ratio of the individual apportionment factor 
(namely payroll, the number of employees 
and operating revenues representing sales) to 
tangible fi xed assets for companies in the same 
NACE sector of the economy [for details, see 
Nerudova & Solilova (2014)]. Specifi cally, the 
following formulae were used for the imputation 
of missing data:
Missing operating revenue amounts were 
imputed using reported tangible fi xed asset 
data (TFA_reported) and the ratio of observed 
average operating revenue (AOperR) to the 
tangible fi xed assets for other companies in the 
same industry (ATFA):
 
(7)
The missing number of employees was 
imputed based on the reported tangible fi xed 
assets of the company and the ratio of observed 
average numbers of employees (ANoE) to 
tangible fi xed assets for the other companies in 
the same industry:
 
(8)
Missing payroll data were imputed based 
on the imputed employee headcount (No.
Employees_imputed) and the ratio of observed 
average payroll cost (APayr) to employee 
headcounts for other companies in the same 
industry:
 
(9)
Furthermore, because Eastern European 
countries have lower levels of apportionment 
factors, mainly payroll, the industry-specifi c 
ratios were calculated separately for Eastern 
Europe and Western Europe.
Subsequently, in order to determine the 
Czech tax base according to current conditions, 
the group taxation schemes and consolidation 
schemes in individual EU Member States 
needed to be researched. Based on the research 
(Nerudova, 2012), the EU Member States can 
be divided into four groups according to the 
applied consolidation or group taxation rules 
– full consolidation (in Netherlands), pooling of 
the result on the parent company (in Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Poland, Portugal), intra-group loss 
transfer (in Ireland, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom) and 
the group where no group taxation scheme is 
available (in Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Slovak Republic, 
Estonia, Romania and Slovenia). The fourth 
group of states covers 10 EU Member States 
for which it can be considered that the CCCTB 
will represent the most attractive tool for 
addressing the possibility that group taxation 
and loss offset within the group.
Based on the above-mentioned 
categorization, the total tax base of each of 
the groups from the dataset (2,424 parent 
companies with 3,860 subsidiaries in the EU) 
was determined, where the profi t or loss before 
taxation was considered as an indicator of the 
individual tax base of each subsidiary. After 
that, the determination of the total allocated tax 
base of the Czech Republic was performed, the 
assumptions of potential outfl ow/infl ow of tax 
bases from/into the Czech Republic were set 
up as a consequence of the implementation of 
the CCCTB system in the Eurozone. In 2015, 
the Eurozone consists Member States such 
as Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, 
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Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Malta and Lithuania.
The fi rst basic assumption is based on the 
fact that the differences in corporate taxation, 
differences in the level of effective corporate 
tax rates among EU Member States and the 
burden of corporate taxes have an impact on 
corporations’ decision regarding the location 
of their economic activity, as proven by the 
Commission of European Communities (1992). 
This factor was also identifi ed in the research 
by Kolářová and Kuderová (2015), which was 
specifi cally focused on companies in the Czech 
Republic. Based on this, Dischinger (2007) 
concluded that the profi t of the subsidiary 
decreases by 7% if the difference in the corporate 
tax rate of the subsidiary to its parent company 
increases by 10 percentage points. Further, 
there is a stream of literature supporting the 
idea that multinational groups have an incentive 
to shift incomes. De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) 
state that multinational group shifts profi ts to 
low tax jurisdictions and expenses to high tax 
jurisdictions. Moreover, Mackie-Mason and 
Gordon (1997) and Bartelsman and Beetsma 
(2003) emphasize that the corporate tax rate 
represents a key determinant of profi t shifting.
Therefore, the potential outfl ow/infl ow of 
tax bases from/into the Czech Republic would 
occur in accordance with the level of effective 
tax rates in the Eurozone. We assume that the 
potential outfl ow/infl ow of tax bases would occur 
if parent companies with Czech subsidiaries 
were situated in the Member States of the 
Eurozone with a lower effective tax rate than in 
the Czech Republic. As is obvious from Tab. 1 
below, the countries applying an effective tax 
rate lower than in the Czech Republic are 
Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia.
Furthermore, according to the research by 
Grubert and Slemrod (1998), income shifting 
is very often connected with real investments. 
Therefore, with respect to Czech parent 
companies, we assume that potential outfl ow/
infl ow of tax bases would occur if the Czech 
parent company has at least one subsidiary 
situated in the Eurozone (i.e., we do not expect 
that a group with only Czech subsidiaries would 
move its tax bases from the Czech Republic) 
when the CCCTB system is implemented.
The second assumption is based on the key 
fi ndings by Fuest et al. (2013) that multinational 
group performs their activities and profi t shifting 
with the aim to minimize the overall tax burden. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the group of 
companies qualifi ed under the CCCTB system 
for the consolidation regime would bear a lower 
Country Corporate tax rates in %
Effective 
average tax rate 
in %
Country Corporate tax rates in %
Effective 
average tax 
rate in %
CZ 19.0 16.7 IT 30.9 24.0
AT 25.0 23.0 LV 15.0 14.3
BE 34.0 26.7 LT 15.0 13.6
CY 12.5 15.2 LU 29.2 25.5
EE 21.0 16.5 MT 35.0 32.2
FI 20.0 18.4 NL 25.0 22.6
FR 38.9 39.4 PT 30.0 27.1
DE 31.0 28.2 SK 22.0 19.4
EL 26.0 24.1 SI 17.0 15.5
IE 12.5 14.4 ES 35.3 32.6
Source: Spengel, Endres, Finke and Heckemeyer (2014).
Tab. 1: Nominal corporate tax rate and effective average tax rate by Member States of Eurozone and by the Czech Republic, 2014
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tax burden after the implementation of the 
CCCTB system in the group.
Furthermore, we assume that outfl ow 
from the Czech Republic would occur into 
a Eurozone country where the subsidiary or 
parent company from the group is situated, 
as supported by the research by Grubert and 
Slemrod (1998). In the case of a higher number 
of subsidiaries in different Member States of the 
Eurozone, selection is based on the nominal 
corporate tax rate (i.e., outfl ow would be into 
the country with the lowest corporate tax rate), 
as assumed by Mackie-Mason and Gordon 
(1997) and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003). 
Moreover, the second scenario also expects 
the outfl ow of the tax base of the Czech parent 
company in order to reach the possibility of 
entering into the CCCTB system, which is also 
assumed by Fuest et al. (2013).
The last assumption made is that only 
companies operating in the industry or providing 
services (based on the NACE code) that can 
be relocated outside the Czech Republic are 
considered (in tables presented as situation 
B) because not all types of businesses can 
relocate easily into a jurisdiction with a better 
tax environment (Nerudová & David, 2008).
However, as mentioned by Avi-Yonah & 
Clausing (2007), this kind of re-distributional 
effect and its prediction depends on various 
future behavioral effects, which are very diffi cult 
to foresee. It can be expected that, based on the 
allocation-formula factors used in the CCCTB 
system, tax havens and countries without real 
substance of business activities can reach 
a reduction of tax revenues, in contrast to real 
economies with an increase in tax revenues.
The determination of the potential outfl ow/
infl ow of tax bases from/into the Czech Republic 
is based on the comparison of the current and 
new tax burdens of each group. In the case of 
the current situation, the effective tax rates (see 
Tab. 1 above) of the country where subsidiaries 
are situated were taken into account in order 
to determine the tax liability (as a tax base was 
considered profi t or loss before taxation of each 
subsidiary in the group). When researching 
the situation of CCCTB implementation, the 
nominal tax rates were applied because, under 
the CCCTB, nominal tax rates are equal to 
the effective ones due to the unifi ed system 
of tax base construction (for the nominal tax 
rate, see Tab. 1 above). The nominal tax rate 
was used on the portion of the group tax base 
under the CCCTB system, which was allocated 
to the individual group members based on the 
allocation formula (6).
Moreover, in accordance with the CCCTB 
proposal, the special allocation formula for 
fi nancial and insurance activities (i.e., NACE 
sector K, dataset from Bankscope) was 
considered. In the case of fi nancial institutions 
(fi nancial institutions are (a) credit institutions 
authorized to operate in the Union in accordance 
with Directive 2006/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council; (b) entities, 
except for insurance undertakings as defi ned in 
Article 99, which hold fi nancial assets amounting 
to 80% or more of all their fi xed assets, as valued 
in accordance with the rules of this Directive) and 
insurance undertakings (insurance undertakings 
mean those undertakings authorized to operate 
in the Member States in accordance with 
Directive 73/239/EEC for non-life insurance, 
2002/83/EC for life insurance and Directive 
2005/681EC for reinsurance), the asset factor 
includes 10% of the value of fi nancial assets, 
except for participating interests and own shares. 
Furthermore, the sales factor of a fi nancial 
institution includes 10% of its revenues in 
the form of interest, fees, commissions and 
revenues from securities, excluding value added 
tax, other taxes and duties. The sales factor 
of insurance undertakings includes 10% of all 
earned premiums, net of reinsurance, allocated 
investment returns transferred from the non-
technical account, other technical revenues, and 
investment revenues, fees and commissions, 
excluding value added tax, other taxes and 
duties.
As mentioned above (in the second 
assumption), only groups bearing a lower 
tax burden in the case of the CCCTB system 
would relocate their tax bases (i.e., their 
taxable presence) out of the Czech Republic. 
In addition, it is necessary to mention that the 
research does not take into account any barriers 
to entry or exit, as we assume relocation into 
the country where the parent or other subsidiary 
is situated. However, the sensitivity analysis 
was performed when the different levels of the 
transaction costs were taken into account in the 
amount of 1%, 5% and 10% of the group tax 
burden based on the current situation.
3. Results
This study simulated the implementation of the 
CCCTB system in the Eurozone for the total 
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group of companies (2,424 parent companies 
with 3,860 subsidiaries) obtained from the 
Amadeus and Bankscope databases under the 
above-mentioned assumptions. The Amadeus 
dataset covered the group of the Czech parent 
companies having subsidiaries with a taxable 
presence in member states of the Eurozone 
such as Austria, Slovakia, Estonia, Germany, 
and the Netherlands and in Non-Member 
States such as Poland, United Kingdom and 
Hungary. In contrast to the Bankscope dataset, 
which classifi ed subsidiaries of Czech parent 
companies in Slovenia, Belgium, Slovakia 
and the Netherlands (as a member state of 
the Eurozone) and in the United Kingdom (as 
a non-member state of the Eurozone). Those 
identifi ed Eurozone states would receive 
the tax bases of the Czech subsidiaries and 
eventually of the Czech parent companies, 
if both the implementation of the CCCTB 
system brought the lower tax liability to the 
group and the relocation of business activities 
outside the Czech Republic was possible. In 
contrast, the Amadeus dataset covering the 
group of other EU parent companies with Czech 
subsidiaries having parent companies located 
in the member states of Eurozone, where the 
corporate tax rate is lower than in the Czech 
Republic (i.e., Cyprus, Ireland, Slovenia and 
Lithuania). The Bankscope dataset does not 
include any parent companies in the member 
states of the Eurozone with a lower corporate 
tax rate than in the Czech Republic; therefore, 
no outfl ow of tax bases is expected in case of 
the Czech subsidiaries.
The research identifi ed that, if the 
implementation of the CCCTB system in the 
Eurozone were to occur, there would be potential 
outfl ow of tax bases of 40 Czech subsidiaries, 
their 12 Czech parent companies, and 20 Czech 
subsidiaries of other EU parent companies from 
the Amadeus dataset. Additionally, the research 
identifi ed the potential outfl ow of tax bases of 
33 Czech subsidiaries and their 6 Czech parent 
companies from the Bankscope dataset. As 
seen from Tab. 2 below, the largest outfl ow is in 
the group of Czech parent companies and their 
subsidiaries. In total, the outfl ow of 93 Czech 
subsidiaries and 18 Czech parent companies 
is expected after the implementation of the 
CCCTB system in the Eurozone. The research 
has not identifi ed any infl ow of tax bases.
The impact of the implementation of 
the CCCTB in the Eurozone on the tax 
bases allocated in the Czech Republic and 
subsequently on the Czech corporate tax 
revenues is presented in Tabs. 3 and 4 below. 
As seen in Tab. 3, the group of Czech parent 
companies and their subsidiaries generates 
the corporate tax base in the amount of EUR 
1,655,877,000 in the Czech Republic. The 
research identifi ed the potential outfl ow in this 
group in the amount of EUR 426,453,000 (i.e., 
almost 26% of the current tax base allocated 
by this group in the Czech Republic). The 
largest outfl ow is expected in NACE sector 
K - Financial and insurance activities (99%). 
However, if the possibility of the relocation of 
the business activities is considered (situation 
B), then the potential outfl ow is expected in the 
amount of EUR 11,879,000 (i.e., only 0.72% 
of the current tax base). As we consider the 
NACE sector K covering activities of fi nancial 
institutions (mainly banks) as a non-relocated 
business activity. Moreover, the outfl ow of the 
tax bases of Czech parent companies is also 
Database
Czech parent companies Other EU parent companies 
To
ta
l p
ar
en
t 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
To
ta
l 
su
bs
id
ia
rie
s
No. of parent 
companies 
No. of subsidi-
aries in EU
No. of parent 
companies 
No. of subsidi-
aries in CZ
Total Out-fl ow Total
Out-
fl ow Total
Out-
fl ow Total
Out-
fl ow
Amadeus 1,587 12 2,427 40 816 0 1,135 20 2,403 3,562
Bankscope 10 6 49 33 11 0 249 0 21 298
Total 1,597 18 2,476 73 827 0 1,384 20 2,424 3,860
Source: Amadeus and Bankscope databases, own research
Tab. 2: Summary of parent companies and its subsidiaries and their potential outfl ow
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NACE1
Tax bases of Czech subsidiaries of the Czech 
parent companies
Expected outfl ow – parent 
companies
Current tax 
base
Expected outfl ow 
of tax base
Expected 
outfl ow of 
tax liability a
Tax base Tax liability a
in th. EUR % in th. EUR in th. EUR in th. EUR
A 1,663 - - - - -
B 7,836 - - - - -
C 110,250 0.08 378 63 20,053 3,349
D 245,368 - - - 296 50
E 12,955 - - - - -
F 8,565 - - - - -
G 341,386 0.08 356 60 10,521 1,757
H 21,084 - - - - -
I 1,813 - - - - -
J 44,540 - - - - -
K2 205,203 2.58 11,032 1,843 187 31
K3 416,579 97.21 414,574 70,721 1,746,359 291,642
L 53,897 - - - - -
M 93,671 0.03 113 19 153,331 25,606
N 3,996 - - - - -
O 73,767 - - - - -
P 557 - - - - -
Q 2,376 - - - - -
R 10,347 - - - - -
S 25 - - - - -
Total Ab 1,655,877 100% 426,453 70,706 1,930,747 322,435
100% 25.76%
Total Bc 1,655,877 11,879 1,985 184,092 30,743
100% 0.72%
Source: Own research and Amadeus and Bankscope databases
Note: 
1)  A – Agriculture, forestry and fi shing, B – Mining and quarrying, C – Manufacturing, D – Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply, E – Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities, F – Construction, 
G – Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, H – Transporting and storage, I – Accommo-
dation and food service activities, J – Information and communication, K – Financial and insurance activities, L – Real 
estate activities, M – Professional, scientifi c and technical activities, N – Administrative and support service activities, 
O – Public administration and defense; compulsory social security, P – Education, Q – Human health and social work 
activities, R – Arts, entertainment and recreation, S – Other services activities.
2) NACE K includes only data from the Amadeus database, considering fi nancial and insurance companies.
3) NACE K includes only data from the Bankscope database, considering fi nancial and insurance companies.
a) In the case of the effective tax rate in the amount 16.7% for the Czech Republic.
b)  Potential outfl ow of tax bases without considering whether it is possible to relocate business from the identifi ed NACE 
sectors out of the Czech Republic. 
c)  Potential outfl ow of tax bases after considering whether it is possible to relocate business from the identifi ed NACE 
sectors out of the Czech Republic. Non-relocated business is highlighted.
Tab. 3: Overall Czech tax base after implementation of CCCTB in other EU MS – part I
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NACE
Tax bases of the Czech subsidiaries of the parent companies 
from the EU Member States except of the Czech Republic
Expected 
outfl ow tax 
liability aCurrent tax base Expected outfl ow of tax base
in th. EUR % in th. EUR in th. EUR
A 3,806 8.03 3,640 608
B 2,179 – – –
C 1,227,361 9.27 4,201 702
D 142 – – –
E 6,291 0.04 19 3
F 36,940 – – –
G 50,989 0.06 29 5
H 26,470 – – –
I 41 – – –
J 129,007 0.03 14 2
K1 594,105 1.97 894 150
K2 1,330,038 – – –
L 14,523 – – –
M 1,886,336 78.32 35,481 5,925
N 8,183 2.26 1,024 171
O 706 – – –
P – – – –
Q – – – –
R – – – –
S – – – –
Total Ab 5,317,117 100% 45,302 7,565
100% 0.85%
Total Bc 5,317,117 41,643 6,955
100% 0.78%
Source: Own research and Amadeus and Bankscope databases
Note: 
1) See explanation in Tab. 3 above.
2) NACE K includes only data from the Amadeus database, not considering fi nancial and insurance companies.
3) NACE K includes only data from the Bankscope database, not considering fi nancial and insurance companies.
a) In the case of the effective tax rate in the amount 16.7% for the Czech Republic.
b)  Potential outfl ow of tax bases without considering whether it is possible to relocate business from the identifi ed NACE 
sectors out of the Czech Republic. 
c)  Potential outfl ow of tax bases after considering whether it is possible to relocate business from the identifi ed NACE 
sectors out of the Czech Republic. Non-relocated business is highlighted.
Tab. 4: Overall Czech tax base after implementation of CCCTB in other EU MS – part II
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expected in order to achieve the possibility to 
enter into the CCCTB system for the whole 
group. In that case, the research identifi ed 
the outfl ow of the tax bases in the amount of 
EUR 1,930,747,000 without considering the 
possibility to relocate the business activity out 
of the Czech Republic (situation A) and only 
EUR 184,092,000 with the consideration of 
relocation. Globally, the expected outfl ow of 
tax bases present the outfl ow of corporate tax 
liability in the amount of EUR 393,141,000 in 
situation A and EUR 32,728,000 in situation B.
Tab. 4 above presents the results of the 
group of the other EU parent companies 
and their subsidiaries apart from the Czech 
Republic, generating the corporate tax base 
in the amount of EUR 5,317,117,000 in the 
Czech Republic. In the case of this group, the 
research identifi ed the potential outfl ow of tax 
bases in the amount of EUR 45,302,000 (i.e., 
0.85% of the current tax bases allocated in 
the Czech Republic by the group) for situation 
A, where the largest outfl ow (78.32%) is 
expected in NACE sector M – Professional, 
scientifi c and technical activities and then 
in NACE sector C – Manufacturing (9.27%) 
and NACE sector A – Agriculture, forestry 
and fi shing (8.03%). The remaining NACE 
sectors (N, K, J, G, E) represent a marginal 
portion of outfl ow. In situation B, the potential 
outfl ow would change fractionally from 0.85% 
to 0.78% of the current tax bases. In total, the 
expected outfl ow of tax bases represents the 
loss of corporate tax liability in the amount 
of EUR 7,565,000 (situation A) and EUR 
6,955,000 (situation B).
Tab. 5 below summarizes the potential 
outfl ow of tax bases for both groups. We expect 
outfl ow of 93 Czech subsidiaries and 18 Czech 
parent companies for situation A and 58 Czech 
subsidiaries and 12 Czech parent companies 
for situation B. After considering these two 
situations, we can conclude that the potential 
outfl ow of tax bases would be in the range of 
EUR 53,522,000 up to EUR 471,755,000 of 
the current tax base allocated in the Czech 
Republic by Czech subsidiaries (i.e., the range 
from 0.77% to 6.76% of current tax bases). 
Moreover, if the outfl ow of the tax bases of 
Czech parent companies is added, the overall 
outfl ow of tax bases would increase in the range 
of EUR 237,614,000 up to 2,402,502,000. This 
overall assumed outfl ow represents the loss 
of corporate tax liability in the range of EUR 
39,583,000 to EUR 400,706,000 (i.e., 0.88% up 
to 8.85% of the corporate tax liability in 2011), 
where the lower limit symbolizes the result of 
situation B and the upper limit the result of 
situation A.
Based on the research performed, we can 
conclude that the mandatory implementation of 
the CCCTB system in the Eurozone would have 
a negative impact on the tax bases generated 
in the Czech Republic and, subsequently, on 
Czech corporate tax revenues.
To validate the results, we decided to 
perform the sensitivity analysis and to take 
into account the transaction costs. We decided 
Amadeus 
and
 Bankscope 
databases
No. of companies No. of outfl ows Total tax 
base in th. 
EUR
Expected outfl ow of 
tax bases in th. EUR
Corporate 
tax liability
in th. EURa
Expected outfl ow 
of tax liability in 
th. EUR
CS CP CS CP CS CP CS CP
Total A1 3,860 2,424 93 18 6,972,994 471,755 1,930,747 4,527,032 78,271 322,435
% 100 6.76 – 100 1.73 7.12
Total B2 3,860 2,424 58 12 6,972,994 53,522 184,092 4,527,032 8,840 30,743
% 100 0.77 – 100 0.20 0.68
Source: Own research and Amadeus and Bankscope databases
Note: 
a) Based on the Czech tax statistics in 2011.
CS – Czech subsidiaries.
CP – Czech parent companies.
1) Results without considering the possibility to relocate business out of the Czech Republic.
2) Results with considering the possibility to relocate business out of the Czech Republic.
Tab. 5: Summary of results
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to perform the analysis for the different levels 
of the transaction costs – 1%, 5% and 10% 
of the group tax burden based on the current 
situation – and analyze how those costs would 
change the potential outfl ow of tax bases and, 
subsequently, corporate tax revenues in the 
Czech Republic.
As seen in Tab. 6 above, the consideration 
of transaction costs would not signifi cantly 
change the potential outfl ow of tax bases 
from the Czech Republic, as the research 
identifi ed only one slight change in the case 
of transaction costs of 10% of a tax base, in 
the amount of EUR 726,000 (i.e., EUR 126,000 
of tax liability). This slight change would have 
a positive impact on the overall outfl ow of tax 
bases, which would decrease the outfl ow from 
6.76% to 6.75% (i.e., by 0.01 %) for situation 
A and from 0.77% to 0.76% for situation B. 
Furthermore, the research identifi ed a change 
in the case of 5% transaction costs; however, 
the Czech subsidiary generates a negative tax 
base, which has zero effect on the potential 
outfl ow of tax bases from the Czech Republic.
Based on the sensitivity analysis 
performed, we can conclude that the impacts 
of the mandatory implementation of the CCCTB 
system in the Eurozone after considering 
transaction costs did not signifi cantly change 
the previous results. The Czech Republic 
would lose corporate tax revenues in the range 
between 0.87% and 8.84% (i.e., a 0.01% 
change from the previous result) of the current 
corporate tax liability in 2011. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the mandatory implementation of 
the CCCTB system in the Eurozone would have 
a negative impact on the tax bases generated 
in the Czech Republic and, subsequently, on 
Czech corporate tax revenues.
Conclusions and Discussion
The aim of the paper was to research the 
impact of mandatory CCCTB implementation 
in the Eurozone on the tax bases and, 
consequently, on corporate tax revenues in 
the Czech Republic and to identify whether 
the implementation of the system will result 
in an outfl ow or infl ow of the tax bases into 
the Czech Republic. The dataset used 2,424 
parent companies with 3,860 subsidiaries 
from Amadeus and Bankscope databases that 
would qualify under the CCCTB system for the 
consolidation regime and group treatment.
The results of this research were reached 
under assumptions built on the idea of profi t 
shifting and related real investments shifting with 
the aim to minimize the overall tax burden of the 
multinational group shown by existent literature. 
We assumed the outfl ow/infl ow of tax bases 
from/into the Czech Republic depending on the 
rate of the effective tax rates in the Eurozone 
and the existence of at least one subsidiary 
of a Czech parent company in the Eurozone. 
Furthermore, we assume that the outfl ow of 
tax bases occurs if the group bears a lower 
tax burden after CCCTB implementation, with 
or without the consideration of the possibility to 
relocate business activities (situations A and B). 
However, as already stated above, Avi-Yonah 
and Clausing (2007) mentions that the results 
Database
Group 
of the 
companies
Changes caused by transaction costs Impact on overall 
outfl ow of tax bases 
and tax liability1% 5% 10%
Amadeus Other EU parent companies none 0
726.26 th. EUR
(126.29 th. EUR)
0.01% decrease of 
outfl ow and tax liability
Amadeus Czech parent companies none none none –
Bankscope Czech parent companies none none none –
Bankscope Other EU parent companies1 – – – –
Source: Own research and Amadeus and Bankscope databases
Note: 1) No outfl ow was identifi ed in this group; therefore, no sensitivity analysis was performed.
Tab. 6: Sensitivity analysis
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of redistribution of tax bases depend on various 
future behavioral effects that are very diffi cult to 
predict. Therefore, the results of this research 
can be infl uenced by this fact.
Under the above-mentioned assumptions, 
no infl ow was identifi ed, only outfl ow – the 
overall outfl ow of 93 Czech subsidiaries and 
18 Czech parent companies for situation 
A and 58 Czech subsidiaries and 12 Czech 
parent companies for situation B. The identifi ed 
outfl ow would represent the loss of tax bases 
in the range between EUR 237,614,000 
and EUR 2,402,502,000 – i.e., the loss of 
corporate tax revenues in the range between 
EUR 39,583,000 and EUR 400,706,000 
(0.88% up to 8.85% of corporate tax liability in 
the Czech Republic in 2011). The lower limit 
symbolizes the result of situation B and the 
upper limit the result of situation A. The impacts 
of the mandatory implementation of the CCCTB 
system in the Eurozone on Czech tax bases 
and, subsequently, on Czech corporate tax 
revenues slightly changed after employing the 
different levels of transaction costs (1%, 5% 
and 10% of the group tax burden based on the 
current situation) in the analysis. Employment 
decreased the outfl ow of tax bases and 
corporate tax liability by 0.01%.
Based on this research, we can conclude 
that the mandatory implementation of 
the CCCTB system in the Eurozone will 
have a negative impact on the overall tax 
base allocated in the Czech Republic and, 
consequently, on corporate tax revenues. 
Under the formulated assumptions, we assume 
a loss between 0.87% and 8.84% of the current 
corporate tax liability in 2011. As the results 
shows, the way how to eliminate the outfl ow of 
tax bases from the Czech Republic in case of 
CCCTB implementation in Eurozone, might be 
the approximation of corporate tax. Comparable 
overall tax burden of the group under CCCTB 
system and Czech national taxation system 
would not motivate companies to shift to 
CCCTB jurisdictions and would therefore 
partially prevent base erosion.
Existing literature on CCCTB contains 
only a few empirical studies researching the 
impact of the introduction of the CCCTB on 
the budget revenues of EU Member States. 
However, none of studies takes into account 
the dynamic effects of the possible outfl ow/
infl ow of tax bases, resulting in the changes 
of corporate tax liability caused by the 
implementation of CCCTB through enhanced 
cooperation (i.e., implementation not in all EU 
Member States, in our case in the Eurozone). 
The current literature does not refl ect potential 
multinational groups’ response to the CCCTB 
system. Only static revenue estimates based 
on the CCCTB’s redistribution of corporate 
income tax collections among the participating 
Member States are performed in those studies.
The research presented in this paper 
goes further, as we merge the data from the 
Bankscope database, which has a signifi cant 
impact on the fi nal allocation of the tax bases 
among the EU Member states because 
it covers the fi nancial sector, which is not 
included in the Amadeus database. Moreover, 
the dynamic factor inserted into the model 
considers reactions of multinational groups to 
the mandatory implementation of the CCCTB 
system in the Eurozone and takes into account 
different levels of transactional costs. In addition, 
the research presented in this paper goes 
beyond the current state of the art because we 
applied special allocation formulas the CCCTB 
proposal suggests for special industry sectors, 
which has not been done so far in any study.
Ultimately, it is necessary to mention that the 
aim of this research was to explore the impacts 
of CCCTB implementation in the Eurozone on 
tax revenues in the Czech Republic. However, 
there are also other impacts connected with 
the CCCTB implementation that were not the 
subject of our research but are also important 
for the creation of the macroeconomic policy 
of the country: the impact on employment, job 
creation or GDP growth. Therefore, further 
research should be aimed at the exploration 
of those impacts on general macroeconomic 
indicators so that policy makers can obtain 
a complex picture of their policy creation.
The paper presents the results of 
the research within the GA CR project 
No. 13-21683S “The quantifi cation of the impact 
of the introduction of the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base on the budget revenues in 
the Czech Republic.”
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Abstract
MANDATORY CCCTB IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EUROZONE AND ITS IMPACT 
ON CORPORATE TAX REVENUES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Danuše Nerudová, Veronika Solilová
The European Commission has been attempting to coordinate the corporate taxation systems 
of the EU Member States since 1962. One of the most ambitious projects in the history of the 
harmonization effort was introduced on 16 March 2011, when the European Commission published, 
after more than ten years of work, the text of the CCCTB Directive proposal. The directive proposal 
suggests the consolidation regime and the allocation formula with three equally weighted factors – 
sales, labour and assets, i.e. the consolidated tax base should be shared among the members of 
the group based on those micro factors. That tax-sharing mechanism as a new allocation rule has 
raised much discussion and will defi nitely have an impact on EU Member States’ budgets. The aim 
of the paper is to research the impact of mandatory CCCTB implementation in the Eurozone on tax 
bases in the Czech Republic and consequently on Czech corporate tax revenues, and to identify 
whether the implementation of the system in the Eurozone will result in the outfl ow or infl ow of tax 
bases from/to the Czech Republic. The research is based on empirical data from the Amadeus and 
Bankscope databases covering 2,424 parent companies with 3,860 Czech subsidiaries. In order to 
verify the results of the research, a sensitivity analysis was also performed. The research revealed 
that mandatory implementation of the CCCTB system in the Eurozone would have negative impact 
on the tax bases currently generated and located in the Czech Republic. As a result of this fact, 
the Czech Republic would lose between 0.87% and 8.84% of the corporate tax liability recorded 
in 2011.
Key Words: CCCTB, group, tax base, tax revenue, Czech Republic, Eurozone.
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